Alan D. Arnold v. Kara H. Arnold : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Alan D. Arnold v. Kara H. Arnold : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
C. Richard Henriksen Jr.; attorney for appellee.
Alan D. Arnold; pro se.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Arnold v. Arnold, No. 20060862 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6829
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN D.ARNOLD, 
) 
Petitioner / Appellant, : 
) 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appellate Court No. 20060862 
KARAH. ARNOLD 
) 
Respondent / Appellee. : 
District Court No. 984901956 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE ROGER S. DUTSON 
C. Richard Henriksen, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 355-0246 
Alan D. Arnold 
Petitioner / Appellant, Pro Se 
5378 South 1345 West 
Riverdale, Utah 84405 
(801) 721-4255 
UT/ 
XP 
"){IfiTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 6 
COURSE PROCEEDINGS 7 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 7 
RELEVANT FACTS 9 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
CONCLUSION 26 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 28 
ADDENDUM 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER A 
FINAL ORDER (FINDINGS OF FACT) B 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988) 
Bayles v. Bayles. 981 P.2d 403 (Utah App., 1999) 
Brooks v.Brooks. 881 P.2d 955 (Utah App., 1994) 
Diener v. Diener. 98 P.3d, 1178, 508 (Utah App., 2004) 
Hall v.Hall. 585 P.2d 1018 (Utah App., 1993) 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 977 P.2d 1226,1228 (Utah App., 1999) 
Starlev v. McDowell. Not Reported in P.2d, 1999 WL 33244801 (Utah App.,1999) 
Williamson v. Williamson. 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46 (Utah App., 1994) 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.2 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.4 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.7 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.9 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.14 
• i i -
circumstances had occurred. The trial court must make findings on all material issues; 
failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 
(Utah App. 1988). The determination of the trial court's determination that there [has or 
has not] been a substantial material change in circumstances is presumed valid and review 
under the abuse of discretion standard. Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d, 1178, 508 (Utah APP. 
2004). 
2) Whether the court erred in its finding that the Appellee has not 
misrepresented her income at the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of 
2003? The Appellant filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005 
claiming that there had been a substantial material change in circumstances concerning an 
increase in the Appellee's income using the criteria outlined in 78-45-7.2 (9)(c)(iii) 
"material change of 30% or more in the income of a parent". The court failed to make a 
finding regarding the claim in the Petition to Modify. A claim of misrepresentation 
(fraud) is a tort and thus is not properly addressed in a Petition to Modify a Decree of 
Divorce. Bayles v. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403 (Utah App., 1999). The trial court must make 
findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988). 
3) Whether the court's finding that the Appellant is "Voluntarily 
Underemployed95 is erroneous and an abuse of discretion? The trial court's findings of 
fact in a divorce action are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Kessimakis v. 
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Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah App., 1999). The trial court, however, must have 
made adequately detailed finding on each issue so that the Court of Appeals can 
determine if those findings were rationally based upon applicable factors. Williamson v. 
Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46 (Utah App. 1999). The trial court must make 
findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988). 
4) Whether the court abused its discretion in its enforcement of a private 
school expenses? The Utah Court of Appeals has held that private school is an 
unreasonable luxury expense. Starley v. McDowell, Not reported in p.2d, 1999 WL 
33244801 (Utah App., 1999). The higher court has also held that private school costs are 
part and parcel of a child support award and have found no authority to the contrary. 
Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955(Utah App., 1994). The court's finding that mandates the 
payment of private school is not supported by law nor any legal authority constituting an 
abuse of discretion. 
5) Whether the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to 
the Appellee on the basis that there was no merit to the Appellant's claims? The 
court has the responsibility to make findings on whether the fees for an attorney are 
reasonable, whether the Appellant is capable of paying, and whether the Appellee is in 
need of assistance in paying her attorney's fees. The trial court must make findings on all 
material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 
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P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988). The trial court also based the award on the finding that 
'there were no merit to the claims of the Appellant in seeking a modification. The trial 
court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible 
error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal 
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust 
the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may include: 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account 
the best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it 
has, the court shall then determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or 
more between the amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required 
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not of a temporary 
nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered to that which is provided 
for in the guidelines. 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of the base 
combined child support obligation. 
-4-
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated 
by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation 
from gross receipts. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then 
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide 
year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at 
least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an 
underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made 
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the 
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as 
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations. 
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in proportion to their 
adjusted gross incomes 
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78-4S-7.9, Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support award shall be determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base combined 
child support obligation using the base combined child support obligation table. 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child support 
obligation by multiplying the base combined child support obligation by each parent's 
percentage of combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so calculated are the base 
child support obligation due from each parent for support of the children. 
78-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table and low income table. 
The following includes the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table: 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce filed by the 
Appellant in April of 2005. The basis for the request for modification was a substantial 
material change in circumstance through the standard of Utah Code Annotated 78-45-
7.2 (9). 
Therefore this case involves the: 
1) the threshold and mathematical determination of a substantial material change in 
circumstances that was not foreseen at the Time the Decree of Divorce was entered or the 
modification of 2003 was adopted. 
2) findings necessary on all material issues. 
3) findings necessary to support the legal conclusion of voluntary underemployment. 
4) the assignment of correct adjusted gross income to both parties and the correct 
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calculation of an amount for child support. 
5) private school for a minor child. 
6) an award of attorney's fees. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The parties were granted a Decree of Divorce in December of 1998. 
The Appellee filed a Petition to Modify in April of 2003 which was settled in 
mediation held in September of 2003. The Appellee was granted a Motion to Compel for 
the "Memorandum of Understanding" in June of 2004. 
The Appellant filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005 as 
stated above. The matter came before the District Court on June 26,2006 with the trail 
court issuing a Bench Ruling through a "Memorandum and Order" on July 11,2006. An 
Memorandum and Objection to Order and Motion to Alter or Amend Memorandum was 
filed by the Appellant on or about July 18, 2006 which was overruled by the trial court. 
This Appeal is taken from the Final Judgement of the Second District Court for 
Weber County, State of Utah, entered by Judge Roger S. Dutson, with the signing of the 
Order Denying Petitioner's Petition To Modify Decree of Divorce on the 31st day of 
August, 2006. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
On complete of the day at trial (June 26, 2006), the trial court elected to give a 
bench ruling and closed for the day. On July 11,2006 approximately two weeks later, the 
trial court enter its findings by Memorandum and Order on July 11,2006. 
The trial court found that the Appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof on 
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all issues contained in his Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. 
The trial court found that the Appellant's claimed income of $3,500.00 per month 
are inaccurate and are not credible as he had bank deposits of $226,132.02 in 2004 and 
$174,652.33 from April to July of 2005. 
The trial court found that there has not been a substantial material change in 
circumstances justifying a modification of the existing orders in this case and that the 
Appellant had no reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested modification. 
The trial court found that the Appellant was "voluntarily underemployed" stating 
in various findings that: the earning capacity of the Appellant has not changed form the 
time of mediation (September, 2003), the Appellant has had the opportunity and jobs to 
increase his income and is subsequently voluntarily underemployed, the Appellant has 
diverted his earning ability to unjustifiable non-income producing activities, the Appellant 
has had employment or opportunity of employment which would provide him with similar 
or increased income as establish in the proceedings in 2003, the Appellant has chosen 
recently to return to school voluntarily reducing his income, and the court has considered 
the possibility of the Appellant being required to move elsewhere in reaching the 
conclusion of'Voluntary underemployment". 
The court found that the Appellant has remained an important part of the parties 
child's life and should be commended for that and that the court anticipates that the 
Appellee will continue to insure the more than normal contact between the Appellant and 
the minor child. 
The court found that the Appellee has not misrepresented her income in the 
establishment of the original child support order of 2003. 
The court ordered a continuation of parties to continue payment for private school 
for the parties minor child through stipulation and order of the previous court as no 
-8-
change was warranted. 
The court ordered that a reduced amount of the Appellee's attorneys fees were to 
be paid by the Appellant on the basis that the reduced amount was reasonable, the court 
believed that the Appellant was capable of paying them, and there being no merit to the 
Appellant's claims. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1) Appellant and Appellee were married on June 10,1988. 
2) The parties had one child born during the marriage on July 19, 1996. 
3) Appellant and Appellee were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce on 
December 3,1998. 
4) The parties Decree of Divorce stated that neither party were to pay child support 
based on equal Joint Custody of the minor child and equal incomes of the parties. 
5) The Appellant had a second minor child born in a subsequent marriage on April 9, 
2001. 
6) The Appellee filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2003. 
7) The parties established a "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)" in a mediation 
session on September 22, 2003 which was signed by both parties and their attorneys 
which established an amount of child support for the Appellant to pay the Appellee based 
on incomes asserted by both parties. 
8) The Appellant requested information verification on income and other requests for 
changes to the MOU in a correspondence to the Appellee on September 27,2003 to 
which the Appellee refused to re-mediate as provided within the MOU and refused to 
address any of the requests for changes. 
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9) The matter of the MOU was settled by the trial court through a motion to compel filed 
by the Appellee through the District Court in June of 2004. 
10) The Appellant filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005 
based on a substantial material change in circumstances claiming first, that the Appellee 
has had a significant increase in the income since the establishment of the MOU and 
second, that the Appellant has had a significant decrease in the income since the 
establishment of the MOU. 
11) The Appellant's Petition to Modify came before the trial court on June 26,2006 
where the afore mentioned "Disposition at Trial Court" was given through a bench ruling 
on July 11,2006 and subsequent Order Denying Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce signed on August 31, 2006. 
12) The Appellant filed a timely appeal based upon those findings. Requested transcripts 
of the trial held on June 26, 2006 are not available do to an equipment malfunction in the 
court causing much of the proceeding to be inaudible. 
13) The Appellant is current on all child support payments which have been paid each 
month in the month for which they were due since the child support order was established 
in 2003 without state or court intervention. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Legislature has established statutory directives which provide the 
method, means and threshold by which the trial court is to address a dispute. This case 
primarily functions on those clear statutory directives. Should the trial court fail to follow 
the directives within the Statutes, it would render them superfluous and inoperative. 
Established case law provides support to the adherence to the directives provided within 
the statutes which provides a standard by which all citizens can expect justice and fair 
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treatment. 
The issues of the showing of the threshold of a substantial material change in 
circumstances, the establishment of the adjusted gross incomes of the parties for the 
calculation of child support, the finding of a party to be "voluntary underemployed", and 
an award of attorney's fees are plainly stated within the directives contained within the 
statutes. The court abuses its discretion when it fails to comply with the requirements of 
law, fails to make the directed findings of fact in order to support its decision, or fails to 
make findings on all material issues. 
The trial court has no legal authority or basis to order the parties to enroll the 
minor child in private school and share the expenses of private school tuition. There is no 
statutory directive regarding this issue and established case law supports the position of 
the Appellant. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point 1: 
Did the Appellant provide the information required by statute necessary in establishing 
the threshold of a substantial material change in circumstances has occurred and that the 
change was not contemplated at the time the decree was entered or at the time of the 2003 
modification? If so. did the trial court abuse its discretion in not following the 
requirements of law? 
Marshaling Requirement: 
1) The Appellant has shown an average monthly income prior to the alleged 
substantial material change in circumstance that greatly exceeds the claimed 
amount brought forth in the evidence at trial. These past monthly averages since 
1998, demonstrate his earning capacity. 
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2) The Appellant has voluntarily returned to school pursuing a Master's Degree 
which shows that he is not putting full effort into his earning capacity. 
3) The Appellant, through written communication, told the Appellee that "his job 
has changed and there is nothing he could do about in unless he moved to 
Chicago". Therefore it assumable that he had an opportunity to move to Chicago in 
order to keep his job from changing. 
4) The Appellant had bank deposits of $226,132.02 in 2004 and $174,652.33 from 
April to July of 2005. These deposit amounts are to the contrary to the $3,500.00 
per month that the Appellant claims as income. 
5) The Appellant bought a townhouse in July of 2005 that is located in the Chicago 
area. The mortgage application for the property, which was signed by the 
Appellant, stated that his current income was equal to the amount he was earning 
prior to the alleged change income claimed as of April 1, 2005. 
Appellant's Argument Point 1: 
The arguments of the Appellee are focus primarily on assumptions, the 
circumstances of the Appellant's past, or the inertia from the past. The statutes governing 
this issue are driven by forward looking statements such as "perspective income", 
"potential employment" and "probable earnings". Past gross earnings do not show 
"potential employment" or future earning capacity as industries change, markets mature, 
and technology advances nor does it take into account business expenses that are 
deducted according to state law. Past deposits do not show "perspective income" as 
finances can be obtained through non-income sources such as mortgages and small 
business loans. The averaging of income does not show current status of income, but 
distorts it by incorporating the past. State law 78-45-5 (5)(a) states that: "When possible, 
gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to 
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determine the average gross monthly income." If gross income is averaged based on the 
amounts of gross income from the time prior to the point in time when the change in 
circumstances occurred, a true and factual picture cannot be attained. The amount from 
the averages shown as "earnings capacity" do not show adjusted gross earning as required 
by statute. 
The Appellant's Petition to Modify was brought before the trial court on the basis 
of a substantial material change in circumstances. The Appellant has the burden to show 
that there was not only a material change in circumstances, but that the change was in fact 
substantial as well as the change in circumstances was not contemplated at the time the 
decree was entered and in the instant case, the time the "Memorandum of Understanding" 
was adopted. 
The criteria for the determination of whether the threshold of a change in 
circumstances is deemed substantial is provided by statute U.C.A78-45-7.2 stating (9) (a) 
A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust the 
amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may include: 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
((c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account 
the best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it 
has, the court shall then determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or 
more between the amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required 
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not of a temporary 
nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered to that which is provided 
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for in the guidelines. 
The criteria in the determination of a substantial material change in circumstances 
is also well supported in established case law. (Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d, 1178, 508 Ut 
App 2004). 
The information dictated by statute needed for the calculation of the directed 
findings in a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce are obtained using: 
U.C.A 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a 
rebuttal presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support (emphasis added). 
U.CA. 78-45-7.5 (5) (b) "Each parent shall provide verification of current 
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements 
and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year...". 
U.CA. 78-45-7.5 (4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a 
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-
employment or business operation from gross receipts (emphasis added). 
U.CA. 78-45-7.9 Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support award shall be 
determined as follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base 
combined child support obligation using the base combined child support 
obligation table. 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child support 
obligation by multiplying the base combined child support obligation by each 
parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so calculated 
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are the base child support obligation due from each parent for support of the children. 
(3) If the obligor's time with the children exceeds 110 overnights, the obligation 
shall be calculated further as follows: 
(a) if the amount of time to be spent with the children is between 110 and 131 
overnights, multiply the number of overnights over 110 by .0027, then multiply the 
result by the base combined child support obligation, and then subtract the result 
from the obligor's payment as determined by Subsection (2) to arrive at the 
obligor's payment. 
Several of the Appellant's earnings statements (year-to-date pay stubs) as well as a 
summary were admitted into evidence under (tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14 p. 1-7) 
detailing a 60% decrease in gross income beginning with the two week pay period ending 
on April 10,2005 to a salaried amount of $2692.31 or $5,833.33 per month (tr. P-l, 
Petitioner's Exhibit 14 p. 4). 
The Appellee's income taxes for 2004 and 2005, the two years following the 
establishment of the child support order were admitted into evidence under (tr. P-l, 
Petitioner's Exhibit 19, p. 1-6). This admitted evidence from statute directed means show 
the Appellee to have a personal annual income of $82,935.00 in 2004 (tr. P-l, Petitioner's 
Exhibit 19, p. 5, line 22) and $73,405.00 in 2005 (tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 19, p. 3, 
line 22). 
The baseline for the comparison for a substantial material change in circumstance 
was admitted into evidence in the form of the Child Support Worksheet calculating the 
child support order of 2003 in (tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) and the Parties' 2003 
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agreement titled "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) (tr. P-1, #2, p. 7, para. #10). 
As stated in the MOU and the child support worksheet, the 2003 incomes of the parties 
were established at $2,000.00 per month for the Appellee and $16,700.00 for the 
Appellant. 
Both the Appellee, who is self-employed, and the Appellant, who is employed and 
responsible for his own business expenses, are entitled to deduct necessary those 
expenses as stated in statute 78-45-7.5 (4) (a). The 2004 and 2005 personal annual 
incomes of the Appellee are in fact "adjusted gross incomes" as necessary business 
expenses were deducted on her business tax returns (tr. P-1, Petitoner's Exhibit 19). The 
Appellant had evidence admitted showing a history of necessary business expenses of 
well in excess of $2,000.00 per month (tr. P-1, Petitioner's Exhibit 15). 
Therefore using the mathematical precision detailed by U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 (9), 
established case law of (Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d, 1178, 508 Ut App 2004), and the 
evidence admitted at trial in this case, the verifiable calculations are: 
The Appellee's adjusted gross income has a sustained increased of over three 
hundred percent (300%) from $2,000.00 per month to over $6,100.00 in 2005 and over 
$6,900.00 per month in 2004 establishing a two year adjusted gross monthly income of 
over $6,500.00. 
The Appellant's adjusted gross has decreased seventy percent (70%) from the 
amount established in 2003 from $16,700.00 to $3,833.00 per month which is the monthly 
gross income less necessary business expenses. 
Using the statutory instruction from U.C.A. 78-45-7.9 Joint Custody Calculation, 
the child support amount to be paid by the Appellant is within one percent of the $258.92 
calculated on the child support worksheet submitted to the trial court (tr. P-1, Petitioner's 
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Exhibit 22) using both parties adjusted gross income and allowing the income deduction 
for the Appellant's other child born prior to the current child support order. The 
prospective amount of child support is a reduction of 64%. 
Statute directive states that a substantial material change in circumstances threshold 
is a material change of 30% or more in the income of a parent and a result of a 15% 
change in the child support amount. In the instant case the Appellant had an adjusted gross 
income decrease of 70%, the Appellee had an adjusted gross income increase of 325%, 
and the prospective child support amount would decrease by 64%. It is instructed by 
Statute directive that the court SHALL adjust the amount of child support if these 
conditions are met. 
The only variable in the directive of the statute is that the court must take into 
account "the best interests of the child". The court in fact looking at many factors 
regarding the best interest of the child as stated in the findings that 'the Appellant has 
remained an important part of the child's life and should be commended for that." 
However, the court failed to enter any detailed findings regarding the best interests of the 
child. 
The court stated that 'the Appellant apparently has the notion that child support 
guidelines must always control child support." The court continues on by stating that 
"child expenses also generally continue to increase as children reach their teen years, even 
though the tables do not reflect that fact." This finding by the court is in direct conflict 
with the statutes and shows a direct disregard for the efforts of the legislature. The trial 
court does not have the authority to bypass the requirements of law and abuses its 
discretion in doing so. 
The Appellant was able to show that this substantial material change in 
circumstances was not contemplated at the time the decree was entered and the 
modification (MOU) in 2003 as both documents were entered into evidence (Decree of 
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Divorce, tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, and MOU tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 2). There is 
no provision in either document that addresses these issues at hand. 
The Appellant has established with the higher court as was established with the 
trial court, that through admitted evidence, all factors required by statutory directive for 
the threshold of a substantial material change in circumstances were complete and were 
not contemplated in established agreements. The trial court abuses its discretion when it 
does not follow the requirement of law. 
Point 2: 
Whether the court erred in its finding that the Appellee has not misrepresented her 
income at the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of 2003? 
Marshaling Requirement: 
1) The Appellant filed an "Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" 
claiming that the Appellee had misrepresented her income at the time of mediation 
in September of 2003 and the enforcement of the "MOU' in June of 2004." The 
Appellant failed in his burden of proof as no evidence was introduced that had any 
showing of this allegation. 
Argument of the Appellant Point 2: 
The claim that the Appellee had misrepresented her income was made in an 
"Amended Petition to Modify" filed by the Appellant after discovery. The trial court stated 
in a ruling from a telephone conference that the Amended Petition to Modify would not be 
heard by the court unless it was justified by the evidence. Evidence requested by the 
Appellant was sent to the trial court for in camera review and was not release by the trial 
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court. Therefore no evidence was presented or admitted at the trial in pursuit of the 
Amended Petition and accordingly the Petitioner's Amended Petition to Modify was not 
heard by the Court. 
The Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005 
claiming that there had been a substantial material change in circumstances concerning an 
increase in the Appellee's income using the criteria outlined in 78-45-7.2 (9)(c)(iii) 
"material change of 30% or more in the income of a parent". The court failed to make a 
finding regarding the claim in the Petition to Modify. A claim of misrepresentation (fraud) 
is a tort and thus is not properly addressed in a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce. 
Bayles v. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1999). The trial court must make findings on 
all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 
P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court must have made adequate detailed finding 
on each issue so that the Court of Appeals can determine if those findings were rationally 
based upon applicable factors. Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46 
(Utah App. 1999). 
Point 3: 
Whether the court's finding that the Appellant is "Voluntarily 
Underemployed" is erroneous and an abuse of discretion? 
Marshaling Requirement: 
1) The Appellant has sustained his employment for several years receiving 
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compensation that exceeds the current amount claimed within his Petition to 
Modify. Given his past earnings, it is highly unlikely that his earning capacity has 
dropped to the level he has asked the court to adopted. 
2) The Appellant has voluntarily returned to school which reducing his income. 
3) The Appellant has had employment and the opportunity to employment that 
would which provide him with similar or increased income. The Appellant may be 
required to move elsewhere to obtain that employment and therefore should be 
considered voluntarily underemployed. 
Argument of Appellant Point 3: 
The trial court's finding that the Appellant is voluntarily underemployed must be 
supported by subsequent findings. First the court must determine whether the finding is in 
fact voluntary, and secondly, that the Appellant is in fact underemployed. 
The Appellant received a major reduction in his salary beginning the pay period 
ending April 10,2005, however no change in employment (company or position) was 
involved in the reduction (P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14). The Appellee presented evidence 
in the form of a letter (R-l, Respondent's Exhibit 5, para. 4 regarding child support 
modification) that stated that the Appellant's job had changed unless he moved out of 
state, but refused to do so as it would take him away from the minor child. The court took 
this statement as an implication that the Appellant had an opportunity and jobs to increase 
his income and stated that he is subsequently voluntarily underemployed. 
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The trial court also allowed findings in the support of finding of voluntarily 
underemployed in the form of the Appellant's demonstrated earning capacity. The court 
also found that the Appellant had diverted his earning ability to unjustifiable non-income 
producing activities by returning to school. The court also considered the possibility of his 
being required to move elsewhere in reaching the conclusion of voluntary 
underemployment. 
The court's findings are not supported by evidence. The change in the Appellant's 
compensation is a direct result of the change in compensation structure detailed through 
evidence (P-l, Petitioner's exhibit 10). The evidence shows that the reduction was 
mandated by the Appellant's employer which began on April 1, 2005. The court found that 
the Appellant's return to school was a factor in reducing the Appellant's income, however 
the reduction was effective April 1, 2005 as detailed in the contract (P-l, Petitioner's 
Exhibit 10) and Appellant's pay stubs (P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14) and the Appellant 
began attending school in August of 2005 (Fall Semester) some three month after the 
salary reduction as detailed by the Appellant's academic transcript (P-l, Petitioner's 
Exhibit 24). The return to school would be more likely to be the result of a possible career 
change resulting from a reduction in salary of the position the Appellant has held since 
1197. 
The court has no authority to require the Appellant to apply for employment which 
would require him to move out of state. There was no evidence presented at trial that the 
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Appellant has had opportunity and jobs to increase his income. The speculatory statement 
from the Appellant to the Appellee that he would have to move to keep his job from 
changing is not a statement of fact but nothing more than a hypothetical statement much 
like a statement such as "I would be rich if I won the lottery". 
There was no evidence presented at trial that the reduction of income of the 
Appellant was voluntary. The Appellant is currently employed by the same company 
holding the same position that he has held since 1997, however the payment structure has 
changed several times in the ten years of employment. (See P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14). 
There was no evidence at trial that the Appellant had applied for employment nor evidence 
that an offer/opportunity of employment was available to him. There was also no evidence 
given at the trial that indicated the level of income for the Appellant in any market other 
than his past earnings which do not indicate whether his change was due to an 
overemployment situation or an underemployment situation. Therefore the trial court has 
no basis for the finding that any underemployment is voluntary. 
The second element of voluntary underemployment is the finding of 
underemployment. U.C.A. 78-45-5 (5)(c) states that "Historical and current earnings shall 
be used to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists." 
In the determination of underemployment or overemployment, the court must establish a 
baseline of comparison using statutory directive that instructs the court to use forward 
looking statements such as prospective income (U.C.A. 78-45-5 (1)) for the determination 
of gross income, and the employment potential and probable earnings for the imputation of 
income (U.C.A. 78-45-5 (7). The court is required by this statute, to derive its conclusions 
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from: work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing earnings of persons of 
similar backgrounds within the community. The court's failure to follow statutory 
directive gives it no baseline of comparison in its determination. 
The court's use of nothing other than historical earnings and current earnings and 
its determination that the Appellant underemployed just because he is earning less money 
renders part of the statute superfluous and inoperative in that an overemployment situation 
may have existed and the current earnings may be in line with the Appellant's work 
history, occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings of persons of similar 
backgrounds within the community. The court abuses its discretion when it merely states a 
historical monthly income of a party and fails to adequately consider the party's probable 
earnings or prospective income. Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999). 
The trial court must formulate detailed subsidiary finds of fact which underlie a 
finding of'Voluntary underemployment" for the purposes of imputing income to a party 
for the purposes of determining child support. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 
1993). The trial court's findings of fact in a divorce action are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226,1228 (Utah App. 1999). 
The trial court must have made adequate detailed finding on each issue so that the Court of 
Appeals can determine if those findings were rationally based upon applicable factors. 
Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Utah App. 1999). 
Point 4: 
Whether the court abused its discretion in its enforcement of a private school 
expenses? 
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Marshaling Requirement: 
1) The Appellant participated in mediation where a "Memorandum of 
Understanding" was developed and signed by the parties and their attorneys. In this 
agreement the Appellant agreed to pay one half of the tuition and expenses at 
Christian Heritage School for the minor child. The Appellee maintains that there 
has been no substantial material change in circumstances in this matter and 
therefore no change should be made to the agreement. 
Argument of Appellant Point 4: 
The decision by the trial court on this issue removes all parental rights from the 
Appellant regarding where the minor child should attend school. The court also has forced 
the Appellant to allocate funds to private schooling for the minor child when these funds 
are needed elsewhere for more immediate issues such as the support of the Appellant's 
family which includes an amount of child support that is paid in addition to the needs of 
the minor child provided for by the Appellant at his home. 
In Starley v. McDowell (Not Reported in P.2d, 1999 WL 33244801 
Utah App.,1999), the trial court found that private schooling was an unreasonable luxury 
expense with no evidence offered that public education would not adequately meet the 
children's needs. This decision was affirmed by the higher court. In the instant case, no 
evidence was presented that public school would not meet the needs of the child. 
In Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955(Utah App. 1994), the Court of Appeals stated 
"we believe private school costs are part and parcel of a child support award and have no 
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authority to the contray". The court's finding that mandates the payment of private school 
is not supported by law nor any legal authority constituting an abuse of discretion. 
Point 5: 
Whether the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the Appellee 
on the basis that there was no merit to the Appellant's claims? 
Marshaling Requirement: 
1) The trial court awarded the Appellee attorney's based on its decision that there 
was no merit to the Appellant's claims contained within his Petition to Modify. 
2) The attorney for the Appellee stated that the attorney fees in this matter were 
reasonable via affidavit. 
3) The court believes that the Appellant is capable of paying the Appellee's 
attorneys's fees. 
Argument of Appellant Point 5: 
The court failed to enter the necessary findings on the material issue that the 
Appellee is in need of assistance in paying her attorney's fees. Failure to do so constitutes 
reversible error. In addition, the court also based the award on that there was no merit to 
the claims within the Appellant's Petition to Modify stating that the Appellant "has had no 
reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested modifications." The facts of this 
matter as established through admitted evidence clearly meet the requirements as outlined 
by statute in establishing a substantial material change in circumstances. 
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The facts also show through admitted evidence that the Appellee is very capable of 
paying her own attorney's fees as she has maintained an adjusted gross income of 
$6,500.00 per month on average during the 2004 and 2005 tax years (P-l, Petitioner's 
exhibit 19). The Appellee also has shown living expenses of $3,600.00 through a financial 
declaration (P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 4, pgs. 3-6). The trial court must make findings on all 
material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 
P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court must have made adequate detailed finding 
on each issue so that the Court of Appeals can determine if those findings were rationally 
based upon applicable factors. Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46 
(Utah App. 1999). 
CONCLUSION 
The legislature understood that changes come to the lives of those that they govern. 
The courts have been given an amount of discretion in handling the issues brought before 
them. However, that amount of discretion is limited and abuses of the court's discretion is 
defined within the statutes. This case shows a clear abuse of discretion in many areas as 
the trial court cannot randomly chose with statutes to follow and which statutes to 
disregard. 
The legislature has provided statutory directives as a means for the trial court to 
address the issues brought before it. The Court of Appeals the responsibility to review the 
findings of the lower court in its adherence to those statutory directives whereby insuring 
that justice is done regarding the people that the branches of our government so govern. 
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The potential for injustice and the potentially devastating ramifications from the 
failure of a court to adhere to the statutory directives not only may cause the destruction of 
a family through unnecessary hardship of one party and the unjust enrichment of another 
party, but it may cause the weakening of our society as our statutes act as pillars of 
strength in the formation of that society. 
The trial court made several errors in the instant case. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has the opportunity and the responsibility to correct those errors and that the lower court, 
while having a margin of discretion, cannot totally disregard the statutory directives 
outlined by our legislature. 
The Appellant would like to thank this court for its review of the issues which have 
significant and long-lasting consequences on his life as well as the lives of his family 
which continues to include the parties minor child. 
The Appellant would also like to apologize for the time that this appeal and matter 
has taken within the court system. However, the issues are very straight forward. They 
have been calculated correctly and presented to both the trial court and the higher court 
with systematic care and mathematical precision as detailed by statute. 
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests that the 
Order Denying Petitioner's Petition To Modify Decree of Divorce be reversed and the 
issues therein be remanded to the proper authority for adherence to state law. 
SIGNED AND DATED This 6th day of February, 2007. 
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Alan D. Arnold, Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of February, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, was delivered in person, to the following: 
C. Richard Henriksen Jr. 
Henriksen & Henriksen, P.C. 
320 South 500 East 
Salt lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM "A 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OEJUTAH 
ER COUNTY. OGDEN DEPARTMENT U J J L ' ' P , : ^3 WEBE  ,  
* V * *V*-* « »* fOKBoisTftici cmm 
ALAN ARNOLD 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
KARA H. ARNOLD 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 984901956 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
mv 11im 
Petitioner Alan Arnold filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in a divorce 
action of December, 1998 and a later mediation, which was subsequently enforced by the court 
on September 22,2003. Petitioner has claimed that his ex-wife misrepresented the amount of 
money she was earning at the time of the 2003 agreement, that his earnings were substantially 
less than at the time of the 2003 agreement, and that he has '...shouldered the major portion of 
the care....'according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. He asked this court to reduce his 
child support obligation, grant him the income tax deduction for the child, change the existing 
medical, dental, vision and orthodontic insurance, and that visitation be changed. 
The petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof on all issues. 
The court finds that Mr. Arnold is voluntarily underemployed and appears to have 
diverted his earning ability to unjustifiable non-income producing activities. Financial support of 
children is a primary obligation of the parents. The court does not find that Mrs. Arnold 
misrepresented her income at the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of 2003. There 
Memorandum and Order 
Arnold vs. Arnold 
Case No. 984901956 
r>«~^ 1 ~e A 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
VD19105104 
QR4Qniq«iR ARNOI D KARA H 
has not been a material and substantial change of circumstances justifying modification of the 
existing orders in this case. 
Mr. Arnold apparently has the notion that the child support guidelines must always 
control child support awards. He had no reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested 
modifications herein. Child expenses also generally continue to increase as children reach their 
teen years, even though the tables do not reflect that fact. This child will soon be 11 years old. 
The court was very pleased with Mr. Arnold's history of remaining a very important part 
of this child's life by giving substantially of his time and commitment to her well being, other 
than his unwillingness to continue appropriate child support payments on her behalf. He should 
be commended for the positive involvement he has with Alexa, as that is normally the greatest 
problem this court encounters in this type case. That fact was also recognized in the trial by the 
Respondent mother. The emotional well-being of a child in divorces weighs much greater than 
the material things which were the primary subject of this hearing. 
However, the court also recognizes that Mr. Arnold's continued substantial personal 
involvement with Alexa should be a major consideration in considering his earning capacity. 
The court believes his increased renewed efforts to increase earnings should create no substantial 
changes adversely affecting his relationship with the child. These parties have historically been 
very successful financially, and that fact helps insure the capability of spending substantial time 
with children, if the parents desire that. In this case, the mother has been very reasonable in 
dealing with Mr. Arnold and the court could reasonably anticipate that she will continue to insure 
more than the normal contact between Mr. Arnold and Alexa. The court has also considered the 
possibility of his being required to move elsewhere in reaching the conclusion of voluntary 
Memorandum and Order 
Arnold vs. Arnold 
Case No. 984901956 
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underemployment. 
Mr. Arnold is capable of paying the attorney's fees incurred by Mrs. Arnold, and there 
being no merit in his claims, will require that he pay reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
herein. The claim is for $22,116.74 attorneys fees and costs. However, in reviewing the billings 
for attorneys' fees and costs, the court has concluded that the claimed amount is excessive. For 
example, the attorney has billed for conferences with associate counsel, even though his rate 
charged is for an experienced attorney in this type case. Additionally, there were no substantial 
unusual legal questions which arose in the case and other than by Mr. Arnold acting pro-se and 
filing an unusual number of pleadings and creating some unusual problems requiring more than a 
normal amount of counsel's time and effort, it was not an unusually complex case to prepare and 
present in court. This court concludes that a reasonable award for attorney's fees and costs in 
this case is $17,700.00 which shall be paid by Mr. Arnold. 
The court would allow continuing attorneys fees which might be incurred for 
unsuccessful challenges to the findings, conclusions and order which the court directs be 
prepared and submitted by Mrs. Arnold's counsel. Such documents will set forth in detail all 
facts in support thereof based on the evidence at trial, and reasonable legal conclusions -
consistent with this memorandum. 
DATED this / / day of ^-J^^Ccj 20C^T^> 
RO'GER S/6UTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum and 
O r d e r l y first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following parties this / / day of 
_, 20 1 6 : 
Alan Arnold 
Petitioner 
5378 S. 1345 W. 
Riverdale, Ut. 84405 
C. Richard Henriksen, Jr. 
Attorney for Respondent 
320 S. 500 E. 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102 
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? CLCOND DISTRICT COURT 
k 
l ZOOb SEP - 5 A P 3 3 
§C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR #1466 
j^ENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 521-4145 
Facsimile: (801) 355-0246 
IN AND FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
S U 7 ^ 
ALAN D. ARNOLD, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S 
) PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE 
Petitioner, OF DIVORCE 
) 
v. 
) 
KARA H. ARNOLD, Civil No. 984901956 
) Judge Duston 
Respondent.: 
The Petitioner's Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce heard before the 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson on the 27th day of June, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. The Petitioner, 
Alan Arnold, appeared in person pro se. The Respondent, Kara H. Arnold, appeared in 
person and was represented by C. Richard Henriksen, Jr. of the firm of Henriksen & 
Henriksen P.C. Both parties offered various exhibits, which were received into evidence. 
The Petitioner and Respondent testified and were cross examined. The court after hearing 
the evidence, reviewing the exhibits, taking the matter under advisement to consider this 
matter, made a memorandum and order dated July 11, 2006 and now makes the following 
Order Denying Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree o 
trt i$& 
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^Findings, Conclusions and Orders: 
1. That the parties were divorced on December 3, 1998. 
2. A mediation agreement was signed September 22, 2003 by both parties 
which resolved child support, visitation and other issues. Petitioner refused to stipulate to 
an order incorporating the mediation agreement and the Respondent had to bring a motion 
to enforce the mediation agreement. The court entered an order adopting and enforcing 
the agreement on June 17, 2004. 
3. A Petition for Modification was filed in April of 2005 by the Petitioner. The 
Petitioner has claimed that his ex-wife misrepresented the amount of money she was 
earning at the time of the 2003 agreement, that his earnings were substantially less than 
at the time of the 2003 agreement, and he has "shouldered the major portion of the care..." 
according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. He asked the court to reduce his child 
support obligation, remove the agreement to share the private school tuition, grant him the 
income tax deduction for the child, change the existing medical, dental, vision and 
orthodontic insurance reimbursement, and that visitation be changed. 
4. The court finds that the Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof on 
all issues contained in his Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. 
5. The Court finds that the earning capacity of the Petitioner has not changed 
from the time of the mediation and in fact the Petitioner has had the opportunity and jobs 
to increase his income and is subsequently voluntarily underemployed. 
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Petitioner to be: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g. 
h. 
evidence 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
from tax returns demonstrated the earning capacity 
$ 8,916.66 per month 
$ 9,916.66 per month 
$19,999.98 per month 
$19,954.16 per month 
$19,041.25 per month 
$17,060.78 per month 
$15,167.91 per month 
$ 7,912.26 per month (voluntarily underemployed) 
7. The Court finds that the Petitioner had diverted his earning ability to 
unjustifiable non-income producing activities. Financial support of children is a primary 
obligation of the parents. 
8. The Court finds that the Respondent has not misrepresented her income at 
the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of 2003. 
9. The Court finds that there has not been a substantial material change in 
circumstances justifying a modification of the existing orders in this case. The Petitioner 
has had no reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested modifications herein. 
10. The Petitioner apparently has the notion that child support guidelines must 
always control child support. Child expenses also generally continue to increase as 
children reach their teen years, even though the tables do not reflect that fact. This child 
will soon be 11 years old. 
11. The Court finds that the Respondent's claimed income of $3,500.00, per 
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imonth are inaccurate and are not credible as the Petitioner has acknowledged that such 
claims of incomes are contrary to the amount of money shown on bank deposits that the 
Petitioner put into his bank, which were $226,132.02 in 2004 and $174,652.33 from April 
to July of 2005. 
12. The Court finds that the Petitioner has had employment or opportunity of 
employment which would provide him with similar or increased income as set forth in the 
Order adopting and enforcing the mediation agreement, and specifically declines to find 
that the Petitioner's income has decreased. The Petitioner has chosen recently to return 
to school voluntarily reducing his present income. The court has also considered the 
possibility of his being required to move elsewhere in reaching the conclusion of voluntary 
underemployment. 
13. The court holds that In order to modify a decree there must be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence substantial change in material circumstances that could 
not have been reasonably contemplated at the time the decree was entered and that 
Petitioner has failed to show in this case that is the circumstance. 
14. The court holds that the Petitioner's increased renewed efforts to increase 
earnings should create no substantial changes adversely affecting his relationship with his 
child. The parties have historically been very successful financially, and that fact helps 
insure the capability of spending substantial time with children. 
15. The court finds that the Petitioner has remained an important part of the 
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^parties child's life and should be commended for that. The court also finds that the 
Respondent has been very reasonable in dealing with the Petitioner and the court 
reasonably anticipates that she will continue to insure more than the normal contact 
between the Petitioner and the minor child. 
16. The parties stipulation and as adopted by order of court to enroll and share 
expenses of private school tuition. Petitioner has been pleassiwith such agreement until 
recently and no change is warranted. 
17. Therefore the Court is not persuaded that any modification is appropriate and 
therefore the court holds there is no cause of action on the Petition and denies the 
Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
18. The Court after reviewing the attorneys fees and costs in this matter believes 
that the Petitioner is capable of paying attorney's fees incurred by the Respondent in this 
matter and there being no merit in his claims. The court finds that although there were no 
substantial unusual legal questions which arose in the case and other than by the 
Petitioner acting pro se and filling an unusual number of pleadings and creating some 
unusual problems requiring more than a normal amount of counsel's time and effort, it was 
not an unusually complex case to prepare and present in court. This court concludes that 
a reasonable award for attorney's fees and costs in this case is $17, 700.00, which shall 
be paid by the Petitioner. 
19. The court will also allow continuing attorneys fees which might be incurred 
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^for unsuccessful challenges to the findings, conclusions and this order upon affidavit of 
counsel. 
DATED this 3L %ay of H^u4f/1\ 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
Thfe Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Second District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 3> day of August, 2006, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF 
DIVORCE was mailed, first class, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Alan D. Arnold, pro se 
5378 South 1345 West 
Riverdale, Utah 84405 
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